Tuesday, July 20, 2021

Nigeria’s Petroleum Industry Bill: Have the Indigenous Host Communities been shortchanged once more?

 by Eze Eluchie


The passage of the Petroleum Industry Bill (PIB) by both houses of Nigeria National Assembly, on the 1st of July 2021, after almost two decades of efforts at crafting a legislation that would rationalize and put into proper context Nigeria’s otherwise mostly unchartered Petroleum industry environment, where any and everything goes, was heralded with a sigh of relief by diverse stakeholders: For International petroleum investors - they now have a one-stop document where the rules of engagement in the petroleum industry was adequately enunciated; For operators (downstream and upstream alike), there was now detailed rules for their operations and for engagement with their host communities (indigenous owners of the lands where crude oil was sourced from); and the Host Communities – despite their initial demands to be accorded 10% of operational costs of the operators, they appeared to be at least, for the very first time, assured of a definite percentage of operators operational costs as their entitlements.

 

It thus appeared that the perennial elusive search for a peaceful environment for our petroleum sector to thrive and maximize its potentials has finally come to an end.

 

Is that truly the situation? We shall now venture to inquire into the PIB from the perspective of the Host Communities, to gauge if indeed the indigenous communities, the ‘geese that lay the golden egg’ of the mainstay of the Nigerian economy, have been well accommodated and their interests addressed by the PIB, which is currently awaiting the signature of the President of the Federal Republic to become law.

 

1.      The definition of Host Community

A host Community is defined under Sec. 318 of the PIB as: “any community situated in or appurtenant to the area of operation of a settlor, and any other community as a settlor may determine pursuant to Chapter Three of this Act”. The emboldened later part of the definition of Host Community (HC), which gives latitude to the Settlor (an Operator in the petroleum industry) to virtually do as it wishes with regards to deciding which community can be described as a ‘Host Community’ is quite worrisome and subject to abuse. Under the PIB, at par with communities where oil prospecting, extraction and refining activities are undertaken, communities over which petroleum pipeline traverse are now deemed as HC’s, and likewise ‘any other community as a Settlor may determine’.

 

In a nutshell, a Settlor can decide that a community anywhere, no matter how detached it is from its area of core operations, is a HC!

 

A situation that provides for such loose definition of ‘Host Community’, allowing wide discretion to the Settlor to determine which community so qualifies, is not well thought through and could give rise to further crisis during the implementation of the PIB.

 

2.      The Host Community Development Trust Fund (HCDTF)

The recognition of the need to allocate a specific percentage of total operational costs to Host Communities is a most welcome development towards attainment of harmonious working, living conditions and existence in our oil producing areas. The rationale behind whittling down the funds accruing to the Host Communities from 10% to its current 3% of operational costs, considering that the betterment of Host Communities is a fundamental objective of efforts at a Petroleum Industry Law, remains shrouded in mystery. {Section 240(2) PIB}. The allocation of a meagre 3% of operational costs for the needs of the Host Communities appears to be where Host Community benefits terminate in the PIB.

 

Under the PIB, the funds due to any Host Community, the Host Community Development Trust Fund (HCDTF) are paid into the custody of a Host Community Development Trust (HCDT), an entity that will be “set up by the Settlor, who shall determine its membership and the criteria for their appointment” {Section 242(1) PIB}. The Settlor will also determine the membership of the Board of Trustees {Section 242(2)}, (a)the selection process, procedure for meeting, financial regulations and administrative procedures of the Board of Trustees (b)the remuneration, discipline, qualification, disqualification, suspension and removal of members of the Board of Trustees; and (c) other matters other than the above relating to the operation and activities of the Board of Trustees{Section 242(4)}, and also appoint the Secretary to the Board{Section 242(5)}.

 

In other words, the meagre 3% of the operational costs which is ostensibly meant for the Host Communities, will not be given/presented to the Host Communities, but would rather be given to an entity created, staffed and under the purview of the Settlors. A Settlor is defined in Section 318 of the PIB as “a holder of an interest in a petroleum prospecting license or petroleum mining lease whose area of operations is located in or appurtenant to any community or communities”.

 

Incredulous as it may sound, under the PIB and in real terms, the 3% meant for the Host Communities will be under the full control of the Operators!

 

3.      Only 75% of the 3% HCDTF will get to the HCDT

Despite the meagre percentage (3% of operating costs of Operators) accorded for development of the Host Communities, under the PIB as passed by the National Assembly, only 75% of the 3% is assured to the HC’s in any given year.  Section 244(a) of the PIB clearly stipulates that the HCDT will allocate 75% of the sum available to the HCDT to a Capital Fund from which it will execute projects that have been approved.

 

244(a) of the PIB oddly enough, has an awkward proviso: “provided that any sums not utilised in a given financial year shall be rolled over and utilized in subsequent year” – making it expressly clear that not all the 75% of 3% may be utilized during a current accounting year. There is the likelihood that, even where the funds are released to the HCDT, factors may occur which will ordinarily make it impossible to use any portion of the said sum in any given year.

244(b) of the PIB Provides for 20% of the 3% to be reserved as ‘Reserve Fund’ for use in years “whenever there is a cessation in the contribution payable by the settlor”. This means that ordinarily, this sum will not be ordinarily available for HC developmental needs, save for when there is a ‘cessation’. More worrisome is the provision of Sec 234(4)[b] of the PIB, which allows the Settlor to, without any reasons being advanced for such refusal, refuse to fund this 20% of the 3% ‘Reserve Fund’ at the Settlors discretion.

244(c) of the PIB Allows for a further deduction of the sums due to the HC, by allocating the remainder 5% of the 3% for ‘Administrative Costs’

 

To further muddle up matters with regards to the deployment of HCDT Funds, the 75% that appears guaranteed for the HC is described as ‘Capital Fund’, which in Nigerian parlance means funds for capital projects. It appears that the funds received by the HC’s cannot be deployed for human capacity development projects such as Scholarships and Skills acquisition endeavors. This is however debatable.

 

4.      Host Communities can forfeit their entitlements

In what can be termed a sinister plot to deprive the HC’s of even this meagre 3% of operating cost allocation, the funds available to the HC’s will be forfeited in the event of “an act of vandalism, sabotage or other civil unrest occurs that causes damage to petroleum and designated facilities or disrupts production activities within the host community” {Sec 257(2) of the PIB}. Innocuous as this provision appears, when it is realized that the HCDT is comprised by nominees of the Settlor and that in most instances of spills and damages to pipelines and other facilities of Operators, the HC’s have always argued that the aged equipment’s of the operators and the lack of maintenance, it becomes clear that the HC’s will always bear the brunt of accusations for vandalism, sabotage and damages to petroleum facilities – and may thus be compelled to forfeit whatsoever was their entitlements under the PIB.

 

If the PIB becomes Law in its present state, the likelihood of HC’s not receiving a dime in the course of any one calendar year, is quite high.

 

5.      Overbearing control by the Settlor

Under the PIB, overwhelming control of the funding, funds, management, operations and structure of the HCDTF is accorded to the Settlor. The Settlor decides how, when, where and who can attend meetings of the HCDT {Sec 234 of the PIB}; the Settlor also provides the sharing formula of HCDT Funds amongst the various HC’s within its operational area {Sec 245 of the PIB}, this could be despite the fact that the HC’s being oftentimes contiguous communities, might have traditional means of sharing joint assets; the Settlor shall decide on what the HC’s need and what can be funded under the HCDTF {Sec 251 (1) and (4) of the PIB}; when the foregoing is added to the powers of the Settlor to determine what constitutes the HC’s entitlements under the PIB; incorporate the HCDT; decide who is appointed a Trustee of the HCDT; decide who can be appointed as a Member of the HCDT Board of Trustees; decide who will be appointed as Secretary of the HCDT and decide who will be appointed Fund Manager to the HCDT; it becomes clear that the communities themselves have very nominal roles to play in the HCDT – the powers, the funds, the staffing, the management of the HCDT are all under the control of the Settlor, and whosoever the Settlor decides to favor.

 

The entity the PIB, as is, protects, empowers and enriches is not the indigenous communities where crude oil operations are conducted/executed, rather it is the Settlor, “a holder of an interest in a petroleum prospecting license or petroleum mining lease whose area of operations is located in or appurtenant to any community or communities”, that turns out to be the primary and sole beneficiary of the PIB

 

6.      Implicit denial of HC’s access to courts to address/resolve disagreements

Under the PIB, HC’s have a maximum of 3 monthsafter the accrual of any cause of action in respect of any such act, neglect or default and provided such act or omission was not done in good faith” to commence any action arising from the implementation of the PIB {Section 307(2) of the PIB}.

 

In addition, HC’s or aggrieved entities can only commence actions under the PIB after the expiry of a 1-month “written notice of the intention to commence the suit” {Section 308(1) of the PIB}.

 

The combined import of Sections 307(2) and 308(1) of the PIB, is that from the time an issue arises between the HC and the Settlor or the NNPC Ltd., the HC has just 2 months to notify the Settlor of their greviance/disagreements, enter into relevant correspondences, hold meetings, retain a Counsel and then issue the statutory 1-month notice of intention to commence action! When it is realized that the Sec 307(2) gives the 3-month period as commencing from ‘the accrual of any cause of action’, and not necessary when the HC becomes aware that they have a cause of action, then it is clear that the 3-month period can actually lapse long before the HC realizes that they have a cause of action.

 

The framers of the PIB could have overreached themselves when they also try to muzzle the Judicial system by inserting provisions which compels Courts to give the Settlor or the NNPC Ltd ‘a 3 months’ notice of the intention to commence execution process’ {Section 308(4) of the PIB}.

 

The provisions geared towards denying HC’s access to courts to enforce their claims or rights is mean-spirited, dubious and likely unconstitutional and void.

 

7.      Vesting on Lands

The Nigerian Constitution vests all lands in any State of Nigeria in the State Governors (for lands in urban areas) and in the Local Government authorities (for lands in rural areas) {Section 1 of the Land Use Act, which by Section 315(5) of the Nigerian Constitution, is an integral aspect of the Constitution of the Federal Republic}

 

The PIB commences with a proclamation in its very first section to the effect that The property and ownership of petroleum within Nigeria and its territorial waters, continental shelf and exclusive economic zone is vested in the Government of the Federation of Nigeria” {Section 1 of the PIB}.

 

The Constitution of Nigeria provides that any other law in conflict with constitutional provisions, is deemed void to the extent of such inconsistency. To the extent that it vests lands in an authority distinct from where the Constitution vests lands, Sec. 1 of the PIB is deemed void.

 

In reality, all Licenses or authorizations to Settlors and Oil companies, issued to such third parties by the Government of the Federation of Nigeria can actually be deemed as unconstitutional and void.  

 

8.      Conclusion:

From the description of what constitutes a HC, to the meager sum allowable to HC’s, and further depletion of the said meagre sum to enable HC’s access only 75% of the said 3% in any given financial year, to provisions which empower the Settlor entities powers to control and manage the HCDTF’s, it is clear that the Host Communities have been terribly short-changed by the PIB as passed by the National Assembly.

 

The PIB, if signed into law, will merely give legal backing to an instrument that is geared to further destabilize the Host Communities, create friction in the oil producing region and very likely foster a cantankerous environment that will not be suitable for meaningful, peaceful petroleum industry operations in Nigeria’s oil and gas rich territories.

 

The President of the Federal Republic is humbly urged to veto the PIB, return same to the National Assembly and urge for more respect and representation from the Host Communities towards ensuring that their needs are met in line with the global best practices in the oil and gas sector regarding addressing the interests and needs of Host Communities.




Monday, October 26, 2020

#EndSARS - The #LekkiMassacre: Call for International Commission of Inquiry

 by Eze Eluchie

 

After over two weeks of continuous street protests by Nigerian youths seeking three key demands, to wit: 1) proscription of the dreaded Special Anti-Robbery Squad {SARS} of the Nigeria Police Force which had been implicated in several cases of extra-judicial murders, extortion and dehumanizing/degrading treatment of civilians; 2) Action against Corruption which had become endemic in Government; and 3) Enthronement of Good Governance at all stratas of governance in Nigeria, the peaceful nature of the protests was brought to a most brutal end by 18.50pm on Tuesday, 20th October 2020, when a continuing staccato of live ammunition fired into the crown by Military personnel, sent the crowd of young protesters in a frenzied stampede, with several killed and scores injured.

 

The brazenness of the attacks had stupefied the protesting crowd, who least expected Nigerian soldiers to openly fire at unarmed Nigerians, who were peacefully protesting for the betterment of the country. 

 

In the ensuing confusion, the scene of the shooting was, in a jiffy, emptied of the mammoth crowd of protesters, with survivors trying to help one another, and hospitals in the vicinity overwhelmed with survivors suffering various forms of injuries. In Television reports following the crackdown, the shooting at the Lekki Toll-gates continued to reverberate in the background.

 

As news of the brutal crackdown went round the city and the country, youths across the country trooped out in their hundreds of thousands to confront authority, unleashing the worst scene of national violence since the current experimentation with democratic governance ensured in 1999. From Lagos, Osogbo, Port Harcourt, Calabar, Benin City, Onitsha, Enugu and Aba in the South, to Jos, Jalingo, Yobe, Kano and Kaduna in the Northern region, an orgy of violence enveloped Nigeria, leaving in its wake looting sprees, mob lynching’s, mass destruction of government and private properties, particularly the burning and destruction of several police station. Conservative reports put the total number of those killed at over 60 persons with properties amounting to several billions of dollars destroyed or looted.

 

Worrisome order of events

In assessing the events which took place at Lekki tollgate in the evening of the 20th of October 2020, it is important to appreciate and recognize key occurrences of the day. These are as follows:

1.      In the morning of the said 20th October, the Governor of Lagos State, Mr. Sanwo-olu issued a statement declaring a night time curfew across Lagos State. This statement clearly sought to provide a legal basis for the deployment of force to evacuate the #EndSARS protesters who had been at the Lekki Tollgates and at the Lagos State Government Secretariat, non-stop, for almost two weeks.

2.      Nigeria’s Federal Government owned media muzzling agency, the Nigeria Broadcasting Commission (NBC) issued an ominous Press Statement warning media outlets and users of social media to be extremely careful on how they report the #EndSARS protests, promising dire consequences for ‘infractions’. A media blackout may have been envisaged via the NBC’s Statement.

3.      Close Circuit Television Camera’s (CCTVs) at the Lekki Tollgate were ominously dismantled – giving indication that someone somewhere had a foreknowledge that events that ought not be recorded were likely going to unfold;

4.      A convoy of soldier arrived at the Lekki tollgate shortly after 18.00 hrs – after the curfew announced earlier in the day by the State Governor ought to have commenced;

5.      Power supply to the Lekki tollgate was suddenly switched off;

6.      The shootings began.

 

Clearly, from the foregoing, there was premeditation of the events that was to unfold and shock not just Nigerians, but the entire international community.

 

Nigeria had just produced its own version of the Tiananmen Square.

 

The Cover-up?

As expected, within 24 hours of the beastly attack, the spokesperson of the Nigeria Army, issued a Press Release denying Army involvement in the shooting and attendant killings and injuries. A few hours later, the Lagos State Government, announced plans to set up a Judicial Panel of Inquiry to investigate the incident.

 

In the midst of the violence, the Nigerian ruler, Muhammadu Buhari, whose silence over the attack by security men at the Lekki tollgate had been condemned by well-meaning Nigerians, made a lackluster National Broadcast during which he did not even mention the carnage that took place at the Lekki tollgate.

 

In an incredulous stroke of folly, during a visit of a delegation of politicians led by the Minister of Works and comprised of several State Governors and Lawmakers, the Minister of Works claimed to have ‘discovered’ a hidden camera at the scene of the shooting, which the said Minister claims will be useful to resolving what actually transpired at the venue of the massacre.

 

Need for international panel of inquiry

When one takes into consideration the track record and penchant of the current Nigerian regime with regards to non-implementation, non-compliance and non-adherence to findings of Judicial Commission of Inquiry and interference in the administration of justice as evidenced in the recent unconstitutional removal of the immediate past Chief Justice of Nigeria and the elevation of ‘compliant’ persons to high judicial positions, one is immediately wary of the zeal with which the governments in Nigeria seem willing to set up Judicial Commissions to inquire into matters in which the government itself, and its military, are deemed complicit.

 

Can a panel instituted by a Government which itself is suspected of complicity in heinous acts be trusted to come out with just findings or outcomes?

 

Will justice be seen or deemed to have been served by the outcomes of a panel set up by a party that itself ought to be investigated for its role in the Lekki Tollgate shootings?

 

It is in view of the commonsensical negative answers that the two questions above will naturally elicit and the fact that the acts alleged constitute crimes within the scope of the Rome Statute (to which the Nigerian State is signatory), that it is prudent in the circumstances to call for the establishment of an International Commission of Inquiry into the Lekki Tollgate shootings which took place in Lekki, Lagos State, Nigeria on the 20th of October 2020.

 

Such an International Panel of Inquiry can validly be established under the charter of the International Criminal Court, the United Nations Security Council, the African Union - African Commission on Human and Peoples Rights and the ECOWAS Community Court of the Economic Community of West African States.

 

 

Picture: #EndSARS sign and emoji




Wednesday, December 18, 2019

Crop Substitution: An Unexplored Strategy for Tackling the Scourge of Illicit Drugs in Africa



by Eze Eluchie

The major internationally recognized illicit substance of abuse cultivated in Africa, particularly the West African sub-region, is marijuana. The cultivation, production and trafficking in marijuana is thus, for most Africans, the gateway into the enterprise of illicit drug cultivation and trafficking.

Nationals of countries in the West African sub-region, or more appropriately put, persons holding Traveling Documents of West African countries, constitute a sizable proportion of extremely low-level suspected couriers (‘moles’ – usually involved in ingesting or otherwise physically ferrying minuscule quantities of illicit substances) involved with international trafficking of illicit drugs into Europe and the United States.

It is in cognizance of the foregoing that it is pertinent that global efforts be harnessed to ensure the minimization, and probable eradication, of practices, enterprises and infrastructure that give rise to illicit drug cultivation and trafficking in Africa.

In some areas of the West African sub-region, communities in their entirety have been known to be engaged in the cultivation of the marijuana plant. Some families are wholly dependent on the proceeds of their marijuana farms for their daily subsistence. These families see marijuana cultivation, primarily, as a means of survival.

In some other instances, poor soil potency has rendered it futile to cultivate age-old food crops (such as yams, cassava, beans etc). To compound the problem of these farmers, they lack the resources to 'switch-over' and invest in enhanced species of seedlings of the food crops they are familiar with. Such small scale farmers/farm communities are easy prey to 'barons' in the business of illicit drug trafficking, who quickly introduce the hapless farmers to the marijuana crop, with promises of seemingly incredulous profit margins. Some of these rural farmers, usually unschooled and illiterate, are, at the outset, oblivious to the criminal nature of their new vocation.

In Nigeria, for instance, there have been instances of whole extended families (comprised of fathers, wives, uncles, auntie's and children, some as young as 7years old) being apprehended and paraded (by our law enforcement/anti-narcotic agencies) as criminal producers of illicit substances – particularly marijuana. The irony is usually that such rural farm families do not make any effort to flee from the arresting officers. These rural farming-families have nowhere else to run to - they are stuck to their farms for life.

In the above described scenario, which is the norm, well articulated crop substitution programs will obviously achieve more positive results than merely punishing hapless people who are only interested in surviving.

When it is realized that over 95% of suspects detained by federal anti-narcotic agents in Nigeria are persons involved, in one way or the other, with marijuana cultivation, possession or distribution, the exigency of instituting a credible and effective crop substitution regime to tackle the problem of illicit marijuana cultivation becomes more apparent.

The African Center for Health Law and Development (ACHLD) through one of its constituting organizations, People Against Drug Dependence & Ignorance (PADDI) has been involved in a series of advocacy initiatives geared towards ensuring that palliative measures consisting of Crop Substitution, backed by necessary financial (or in-kind) support is extended to indigent farmers engaged in the cultivation of marijuana. ACHLD-PADDI had an opportunity to raise the issue of the absence of crop substitution programs for illicit drug producers in the course of the release of the International Narcotics Control Board (INCB) Annual Report by the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) in Lagos, Nigeria.

At the occasion, which had in attendance Dr. Phillip Emafo, a Nigerian and former Chair of the INCB, the Chairman of the Nigerian National Drug Law Enforcement Agency (NDLEA) and the UNODC Country Representative for Nigeria in attendance, it was worrying to realize that no plausible reasons were presented for the failure of the international community to explore and apply crop substitution techniques as a strategy to curtail illicit production of drugs in Africa.
 
The suggested initiatives is predicated on the fact that farmers who engage in illicit cultivation of marijuana purely as a means of survival, deserve an opportunity to cultivate alternative crop, prior to the hammer of prosecution and incarceration being wielded on such indigent farmers.

The idea, Crop Substitution, is admittedly not novel. Crop Substitution is a recognized and successful strategy adopted by the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) and a plethora of domestic authorities/governments to curtail the production of coca (cocaine) and opium (heroin) in such diverse countries as Colombia, Bolivia, Peru, Afghanistan, Pakistan and India.

Most unfortunately, and for as yet inexplicable reasons, the UNODC and relevant domestic governments have not deemed it fit to adapt Crop Substitution techniques to the African environment as a strategy to combat illicit drug production. 

Is it that the African farmer does not deserve an opportunity to substitute an illicit crop with legitimate produce, which has the potential for offering him/her commensurate, if not higher, pecuniary gains? Does the African farmer not deserve the same treatment as his colleagues in Latin America and Asia where the international community invests heavily to ensure the eradication, or at least minimization, of the acreage under illicit drug cultivation?

The intention of this piece should not be misconstrued as an attempt to create the picture of 'an innocent victim' for all persons involved in the illicit cultivation of marijuana in Africa. Far from it. There is no doubt that there exists out there, in various remote corners of the African continent, thousands of greed-induced persons involved with the illicit cultivation of marijuana. It is our belief and opinion that the full weight of the law should be brought to bear on such characters. 

The concern in advocating for adoption of crop substitution mechanisms as a strategy in tackling illicit drug production in Africa, is borne out of the realization that 'ignorance' and 'abject poverty', a lethal combination anywhere, is much in abundance amongst rural farming communities on the African continent. By moving hastily to penalize illiterate rural farmers engaged in illicit drug production, without adequate sensitization, education and alternatives being proffered, a miscarriage of justice is effected. 




Picture: Nigeria’s National Drug Law Enforcement Agency (NDLEA) official at the site of a confisticated illicit Marijuana farm.